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ECONOMICS OF LAW  
AS CHOICE OF LAW 
RALF MICHAELS* 
If it is true that the more developed state of economics, as compared to the other 
social sciences, has been due to the happy chance (for economics) that the important 
factors determining economic behaviour can be measured in money, it suggests that 
the problems faced by practitioners in these other fields are not likely to be dissipated 
simply by an infusion of economists, since in moving into these fields, they will 
commonly have to leave their strength behind them. The analysis developed in 
economics is not likely to be successfully applied in other subjects without major 
modifications. 
R.H. Coase
 1 
I 
INTRODUCTION: ECONOMICS DISCOVERS CHOICE OF LAW 
Economics is about choice.2 It is about private choice and public choice, and 
it is about choice made by individuals and choice made by the state. This means 
economics of law should be about choice of law. It should be about choice of 
the applicable private and public law, and it should be about private and public 
choice of law—choice of law by individuals or by the state. 
In a broad sense, this is the case. Normative law and economics tells us what 
kinds of legal regimes to choose from the various models we can think of: 
negligence or strict liability for tort law, specific performance or damages for 
contract law, restrictions of market entry or monopoly positions as triggers of 
antitrust law, and so forth. Normative law and economics also tells us whether 
the relevant choices should be made by individuals—especially through 
contract—or whether the respective rules should be provided by the state. 
Choice of law as a field is also about choices like the one between 
negligence and strict liability. But this choice is not made in general: it is made 
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 1. R.H. Coase, Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 209 (1978). 
 2. See, e.g., the title of one widely used textbook, JAMES D. GWARTNEY ET AL., ECONOMICS: 
PRIVATE & PUBLIC CHOICE 3 (11th ed. 2005) (“Economics is about how people choose.”); RICHARD 
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (7th ed. 2007) (“Economics, the science of human 
choice”). 
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in a specific constellation, for example between the negligence regime 
governing in the state where a defective machine was sold and the strict-liability 
regime governing in the state where that machine was produced. Choice of law 
is about private and public choice of law, the tension between objective 
determination of the applicable law and party autonomy. But the law thus 
chosen is always, at least so far, the law of a state.3 
In view of this similarity in sensitivities between choice of law and law and 
economics, it may seem surprising that economists all but ignored choice of law 
for many years. Although conflict of laws had been the first field that legal 
realism attacked and although it remains the field in which realist and post-
realist conceptions have had the most impact,4 law and economics, as a 
(sometime) self-declared heir of realism, has stayed away from the field for a 
long time. This is no longer so. Things have changed, and economics of choice 
of law has become prominent. The economics of choice of law is the theme of 
two books5 and one lecture at the Hague Academy of International Law,6 and it 
boasts contributions to two encyclopedias7 and by now a considerable number 
of law-review articles,8 many of which have recently been compiled in a two-
 
 3. Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-ment of Non-State Law. The State, Choice of Law, and the 
Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209 (2005). 
 4. For the best analysis of the role of legal realism in this oft-told history, see Annelise Riles, A 
New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973 (2005). 
 5.  The first is MICHAEL J. WHINCOP & MARY KEYES, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM IN THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS (2001). For reviews, see Richard Garnett, 26 MELB. U. L. REV. 236 (2002); Peter 
Mankowski, 69 RABELSZ 175 (2005); Megan Richardson, Policy Versus Pragmatism? Some Economics 
of Conflict of Laws, 31 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 189 (2002); Michael J. Solimine, The Law and 
Economics of Conflict of Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 208 (2002); Roberta Wertman, 35 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 1160 (2003). A second book is JÜRGEN BASEDOW & TOSHIYUKI KONO, AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). For a review, see Paul Lagarde, 103 
REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 665 (2007). Giesela Rühl (Hamburg Max Planck 
Institute for Comparative and International Private Law and European University Institute, Florence) 
is working on a comprehensive monograph on the topic. 
 6. Horatia Muir Watt, Aspects Economiques du Droit International Privé, in ACADEMIE DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE, 307 RECUEIL DES COURS 25 (2004). 
 7.   Erin A. O’Hara & Francesco Parisi, Conflict of Laws, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 387 (Peter Newman ed., vol. 1, 1998); Erin O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, 
Conflict of Laws and Choice of Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 631–60 (Bouckaert 
& De Geest eds., vol. 5, 2000), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/ 9600book.pdf; Francesco Parisi 
& Larry E. Ribstein, Choice of Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE 
LAW 236 (Peter Newman ed., vol. 1, 1998). See also the brief survey in Alan O. Sykes, International 
Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 757, 816–18 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell 
eds., 2007). 
 8. More recent foundational articles in the United States include the following: LEA BRILMAYER, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 169–218 (2d ed. 1995); Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 
GEO. L. J. 883 (2002); Larry D. Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1990); 
Erin O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1151 (2000); Giesela Rühl, Methods and Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic Perspective, 24 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 801 (2006); Michael J. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice 
of Law, 24 GA. L. REV. 49 (1989); Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation 
of Government Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 975 (1994); Joel P. Trachtman, Economic 
Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2001), adapted as chapter 2 in JOEL P. 
TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 26–71 (forthcoming 2008). Two 
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volume issue.9 Almost all of these studies are normative10 and oriented toward 
either efficiency or maximization of welfare: they set out to yield criteria for 
better, more efficient, conflict-of-laws norms. The powerful arguments, almost 
thirty years old, why efficiency and welfare are both problematic criteria to 
determine better rules11 are largely ignored, as they are in other areas of the law. 
This interest of economists in conflict of laws holds promises for economists 
and lawyers alike. The benefits to economists are not the topic of this article 
(though they exist without doubt).12 The law can certainly benefit from 
interdisciplinary analysis. Famously and repeatedly referred to as a “dismal 
swamp,”13 choice of law as a discipline indeed yearns for intellectual nurture. 
The clean laboratories of economic modeling promise to provide answers to the 
perpetual problems that choice of law faces as a discipline. Where choice of law 
is viewed as too conceptual and abstract,14 economics promises much-needed 
pragmatism.15 Where choice-of-law doctrine is chided for its oblivion to the 
practical impact of its rules,16 law and economics promises to provide empirical 
foundations.17 Where choice of law is viewed as devoid of theory,18 economics 
 
general articles on the economic analysis from a non-U.S. perspective are Kurt Siehr, Ökonomische 
Analyse des Internationalen Privatrechts, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARL FIRSCHING ZUM GEBURTSTAG 
269 (Dieter Henrich & Bernd von Hoffmann eds., 1985); Horatia Muir Watt, Law and Economics: 
Quel apport pour le droit international privé?, in LE CONTRAT AU DEBUT DU XXIEME SIECLE—
ETUDES OFFERTES A JACQUES GHESTIN 685 (Gilles Goubeaux et al. eds., 2001). 
 9. THE ECONOMICS OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (Erin O’Hara ed., 2007). 
 10. For a positive analysis, see Solimine, supra note 8. 
 11. E.g., Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Duncan Kennedy, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981); Mario Rizzo, 
The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980). On the ineffectiveness of this critique, see 
Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?, 64 MD. L. REV. 101, 109–12 (2005). For 
criticism of efficiency as a criterion for optimal choice-of-law rules (and a promising alternative 
approach), see Christian Kirchner, An Economic Analysis of Choice-of-Law and Choice-of-Forum 
Clauses, in BASEDOW & KONO, supra note 5, at 34. 
 12. See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of Cross-
Border Legal Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights With Responsibilities, 23 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 451 (2008). 
 13. The quote was first introduced by torts scholar William L. Prosser in Interstate Publication, 51 
MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953). 
 14. For a particularly stark recent statement, see Earl M. Maltz, Do Modern Theories of Conflict of 
Laws Work? The New Jersey Experience, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 527, 547–48 (2005). 
 15. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 6–7. 
 16. Hillel Y. Levin, What Do We Really Know About the American Choice-of-Law Revolution?, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 247, 249, 256–60 (2007). 
 17. See generally Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357 (1992); Solimine, supra note 8; Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of 
Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1994). See also Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic 
Courts and Global Governance (Aug.11, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=923907. 
 18. Riles, supra note 4, at 974. 
MICHAELS__BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC 10/27/2008  7:54:45 AM 
76 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 71:73 
 
promises to be that theory.19 Where choice of law is viewed as hopelessly 
complex,20 economics promises to provide clear guidelines.21 
This article does not aim at evaluating the contribution of law and 
economics at large. Instead, the interest lies in a very particular question, 
namely, how far economic models can function as doctrine. This may look like a 
deliberate misreading of their purpose. If one views law and economics as 
antidoctrinal and antiformalist, it seems inappropriate to read it as doctrine. Yet 
most doctrine today is, or claims to be, antiformalist. And most economic 
models make very concrete proposals as to how choice-of-law rules should be 
shaped. In this sense, economic analysis is like any other analysis of law.22 And 
to the extent it aims to inform the resolution of cases, it can, and should, be 
measured against the same standards. 
This article makes it clear that economics does not and probably cannot 
fulfil this function. However, this failure makes a very important contribution to 
choice of law. It is the heroic failure of economic analysis, not its claimed 
success, that presents a real, and immensely valuable, contribution. Economic 
models achieve clarity, but the unrealistic abstractions necessary to achieve it 
only highlight the inescapable messiness of the problems with choice of law. 
The isolation of certain values in the economic analysis, especially those of 
private and public ordering, respectively, shows that it is the combination of, 
and the conflict between, these values that defines the field. The failure of 
attempts to develop new solutions on the basis of abstract economic reasoning, 
regardless of existing doctrine, makes us see clearly the high degree of 
disciplinary knowledge that is present, though often unacknowledged, within 
our doctrinal concepts and rules, imperfect as they are. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Part II compares 
existing doctrine and economic models on a macro level. This comparison 
shows greater proximity than is usually acknowledged. The economic models 
are largely based on existing doctrinal models, while those models in turn can 
be read as resting on certain economic ideas. The part focuses especially on 
three types of models—a private law model, an international law model, and a 
combined model—and addresses the role of the best law in each of these 
models. Part III moves to a micro-comparison and analyzes how the different 
economic models fare in responding to existing problems in choice of law. It 
uses three different questions as example. One question concerns the rules for a 
specific problem, the law applicable to transboundary torts. The second 
question concerns a traditional, general problem of choice of law, namely the 
 
 19. Michael J. Whincop & Mary Keyes, Towards an Economic Theory of Private International 
Law, 25 AUSTRALASIAN J. LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 1 (2000). 
 20. This criticism is shared (or adopted) by economists. See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 430 (1990). 
 21. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 7; but see Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 
10–11. 
 22. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4 (2004). 
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issue of characterization. The third question is one of design of rules, namely 
that of whether rules or standards are preferable. In all three questions, it turns 
out that economic models replicate both the responses given to doctrinal 
questions and the disputes over these results existing in doctrine. In this sense, 
instead of resolving these disputes, existing economic models reinforce the 
impression that these disputes are not resoluble. Part IV finally goes to the core 
of the three models by analyzing an issue central to all of them: the relation 
between party autonomy and binding state law. This analysis reveals that two of 
the economic models ultimately collapse into substantive-law models (of private 
law and of international law respectively), whereas the third one, the combined 
model, makes a meaningful and potentially renewing contribution to the field of 
choice of law. The conclusion assesses the contribution made by economics to 
choice of law and notes that this contribution is very important, though not in 
the anticipated way. 
II 
ECONOMIC MODELS AS DOCTRINAL MODELS 
Economists have claimed that “[t]he theories [of choice of law] that have so 
far held centre stage owe virtually nothing to economic theory.”23 Consequently, 
most economic analyses start out by dismissing existing doctrines of choice of 
law24 before presenting their own economic model as something entirely new. 
But the hope to resolve, once and for all, existing questions, seems improbable 
in view of the “foregone conclusion,” expressed in this very journal forty-five 
years ago, “that everything worthy of trying has been tried before, under the 
same or other labels.”25 And, alas, the claim that an economic approach brings 
something entirely new turns out to be exaggerated too. 
On the one hand, doctrine never developed oblivious to economics and 
economic theory. As early as the 1890s, German choice-of-law scholar Ludwig 
von Bar, in a presentation for economists, based choice of law on two simple 
economic arguments: a reciprocity argument (each country is better off if it 
treats foreigners equally to citizens) and a rough market-related argument 
(trade will prosper more if foreigners can take some rules of their own legal 
 
 23. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1152; cf. Guzman, supra note 8, at 885–86 (“[E]fficiency 
analysis in general, and law and economics in particular, has, to date, had only a minor impact on 
choice of law.”). 
 24. Guzman, supra note 8, at 890–94; O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1165–84; WHINCOP & 
KEYES, supra note 5, at 8–26. For a more benevolent analysis, see Trachtman, Conflict of Laws, supra 
note 8, at 998–1022. See also Kazuaki Kagami, The Systematic Choice of Legal Rules for Private 
International Law: An Economic Approach, in BASEDOW & KONO, supra note 5, at 15, 24–28. 
 25. Kurt H. Nadelmann, Marginal Remarks on the New Trends in American Conflicts Law, 28 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 860, 860 (Autumn 1963), cited in FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND 
MULTISTATE JUSTICE 6 (1993). 
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systems with them).26 One of the “new foundations” formulated by Andrew 
Guzman more than 110 years later reformulates this finding quite exactly.27 This 
part will show how some doctrinal arguments can be read as economics (albeit 
unformalized and often crude)—typically, the economics of the time. Even the 
most formalistic doctrines can be shown to rest on economic ideas. 
On the other hand, most economic models owe more than they admit to 
traditional models in choice of law. In choice-of-law doctrine, no agreement 
exists on what questions should be asked. Is choice of law about conflicts 
between states and their desires to regulate (as the governmental-interest 
analysis dictates it)? Or is it about conflicts between private rights acquired in 
one state and public regulation in another (as in a vested-rights theory)? Or is it 
not about conflicts at all, but merely about the technical designation of the 
applicable law? Economic models would be extremely helpful if they could 
point us to the right question, but few of them try to do so. Instead, most of 
them choose one of these questions as the relevant one without spending much 
time justifying this choice, and then give economically substantiated answers to 
their chosen question. 
With some generalization, it is possible to distinguish three economic 
models: a private-law model, an international-law model, and a combined 
model. If this article assigns the work of individual scholars to one of these 
models, this is done neither to claim they fit fully in one of the categories, nor to 
claim that all they contribute is the establishment of these models. However, the 
fact that they pose different questions makes it possible to group them and 
discuss the ensuing groups instead of the individual models. The first two of 
these models share close affinity with two doctrinal models: the vested-rights 
theory (in its old version and in its new version as country-of-origin principle) 
and governmental-interest analysis. The third model, in turn, has spurred new 
approaches to choice of law as a regulatory instrument. 
A. Private-Law Models 
A first economic approach, represented in particular by Whincop and 
Keyes, and to some extent by O’Hara and Ribstein, can be called a “private-law 
model.” An economic private-law model will apply considerations from the 
economics of private law to the design of private-international-law rules;28 it 
 
 26. LUDWIG VON BAR, DAS FREMDENRECHT UND SEINE VOLKSWIRTSCHAFTLICHE 
BEDEUTUNG 26 (1893). Von Bar was the author of several books on conflict of laws, two of which have 
been translated into English. The reciprocity argument, though usually phrased in less economic terms, 
is even older. See the references in JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 35, 
45–46 (3d ed. 1846). 
 27. Guzman, supra note 8, at 927–30. 
 28. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 3 (“[T]he policies that underlie what we think of as 
‘substantive’ private law areas should, where suitable, inform the private international law rules that 
apply in these areas.”). 
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focuses on individuals and individual interest.29 The goal is either efficiency or 
the maximization of global social welfare, understood as the sum of the utilities 
of all individuals worldwide.30 The main way to achieve these goals is private, 
contractual choice of law.31 When parties choose the applicable law, this choice 
should usually be enforced. When private choice is either impossible or not 
executed, the contracts paradigm does not cease to govern: choice-of-law rules 
should enable the law applied to fit as smoothly into a contractual scheme as 
possible. Substantively, choice-of-law rules should mimic the result of a 
hypothetical choice-of-law agreement between the parties.32 Formally, they 
should provide clear and predictable rules enabling the parties to contract, or 
settle, against a firm baseline.33 One solution that some authors accept, if 
somewhat reluctantly, is to resort to the subsidiary use of an approach of 
“regulatory advantage.”34 According to this approach, developed by Judge 
Posner, courts should determine the applicable law by reference to the 
government that has the greatest ability to regulate the relevant conduct, which 
usually coincides with territoriality.35 For torts outside market relations, this is 
usually lex loci delicti.36 This should ensure, ideally, that parties will be governed 
by the best (and thus the most efficient) substantive law. 
When all focus is on the interests of individuals, other policy 
considerations— especially those promulgated by states as mandatory laws—
are suspect. Once the necessity of mandatory rules has been defined away 
(because private transactions are presumed efficient), such laws are opposed 
because they are unlikely to represent the interests of all individuals 
represented37 and are (therefore) often inefficient.38 Invocations of sovereignty 
 
 29. Id. at 34; O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1152–53, 1185. 
 30. Guzman, supra note 8, at 898; Siehr, supra note 8, at 274. 
 31. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1186–87; Rühl, supra note 8, at 802; WHINCOP & KEYES, 
supra note 5, at 29. 
 32. Michael Whincop & Mary Keyes, Putting the ‘Private’ Back into Private International Law: 
Default Rules and the Proper Law of the Contract, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 515, 536 (1997); but cf. 
WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 22. See also Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Katrin Lantermann, Choice of 
Law in Economic Perspective, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 5, at 87, 97–98. For discussion, see Jürgen Basedow, Lex Mercatoria and the Private International 
Law of Contracts in Economic Perspective, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, supra note 5, at 57, 69–71. 
 33. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1188–92; WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 44–45 (for 
contracts). 
 34. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1190–92. 
 35. The concept is developed by RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 602–03 
(2003). For examples of the concept’s application, see Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d 1055, 
1058 (7th Cir. 1987), and Spinozzi v. Itt Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1999). For critical 
discussion, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, Lex Loci Delictus and Global Economic Welfare: 
Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1139–43 (2007); O’Hara & Ribstein, supra 
note 8, at 1179–80; Solimine, supra note 8, at 59–68; Trachtman, Choice of Law, supra note 8, at 1022–
26; WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 20. 
 36. Spinozzi, 174 F.3d at 844–45; WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 97–104; O’Hara & Ribstein, 
supra note 8, at 1216–18. 
 37. Paul A. Stephan, The Political Economy of Choice of Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 957, 958–59 (2002). 
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to justify their application are denounced as communitarian39 and as 
smokescreens for what are really political tastes.40 Policies and justice are 
dismissed because they display no pragmatic values.41 Consequently, the desire 
of parties to avoid such inefficient rules is to be encouraged and supported. 
This, in fact, is one main purpose of party autonomy. By and large, the only 
policies worth pursuing in private international law are those of private law,42 
and that means, apparently, the protection of private-property rights and 
transactions. The tendency expressed in the title of one leading article—“from 
politics to efficiency”43—suggests how politics is viewed as standing in contrast 
to desirable efficiency.44 
Distrust in politics and a focus on the interests of individuals over those of 
governments are not, of course, inventions of the private-law model. Such 
considerations underlie an old doctrinal approach to choice of law: the theory of 
vested rights, under which courts are bound to enforce rights vested under a 
foreign law typically determined by some territorial connection.45 That approach 
is now universally condemned, and economists within the private-law model 
largely chime in on the condemnation,46 even though they share many of the 
convictions underlying the vested-rights theory47—the focus on individual 
interests and on territoriality, a disdain for public policy, mandatory substantive 
laws and governmental interests, and an emphasis on formal interests like 
predictability over substantive considerations of policy. 
Closer scrutiny suggests grounds for the affinity. The vested-rights theory is 
not grounded merely in formalism or metaphysics, as is regularly suggested. Its 
main propagator, Joseph Beale, used instrumental and even purely economic 
justifications for applying a single pertinent law to activity: “society requires the 
final distribution of all costs, including those of accidents, so that they will come 
into the cost of production or of use and be shared among the ultimate 
 
 38. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1156–60. 
 39. Stephan, supra note 37, at 957–58. 
 40. Id. at 958. 
 41. For the strongest statement in this regard, see WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 32–34. 
 42. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 3. 
 43. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8; see also Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in 
Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363 (2003) (criticizing such a development toward politics). 
 44. But see, for clarification of this point, Erin O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Rules and Institutions 
in Developing a Law Market: Views from the US and Europe, TUL. L. REV. Part I.D.4 (forthcoming 
2008) (“[T]he relevant choice is not between efficiency and other values, but between political and 
contractual mechanisms for achieving efficiency.”). 
 45. For overview, see Ralf Michaels, EU Law as Choice of Law? Reconceptualising the Country-of-
Origin Principle as Vested-Rights Theory, 2 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 195 (2006). 
 46. See Guzman, supra note 8, at 891; O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, 1166–68. But see id. at 1165 
(“[F]or all its arbitrariness, the vested rights theory comes closer to satisfying an efficiency criterion . . . 
.”). See also WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 14–15. But see Stephan, supra note 37, at 957 n.2. 
 47. See, for example, Judge Posner’s reasoning in Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d at 
1057, and WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 17–19. 
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consumers,”48 which requires “keeping the expense of new social protection at 
its lowest point consistent with efficiency.”49 
The underlying idea that insurance costs must be internalized as costs of 
production and as such must be held low underlies Pigovian economics (which 
were popular in Beale’s time), as well as current economic thought. If Pigou is 
now nonetheless widely rejected,50 it is so not because of the idea of 
internalization. Rather, today’s economists usually follow Coase’s finding 
contrary to Pigou that, as long as rights are clearly defined and transaction costs 
are sufficiently low, the market will be better than the state at optimally 
allocating rights. In choice of law, the parallel is to let parties themselves 
determine the applicable law. Consequently, what economists mainly criticize is 
that the vested-rights theory allows no space for party determination of the 
applicable law. But this is not an intrinsically necessary element of a theory 
focused on vested rights. This shortcoming has been remedied by the 
renaissance of the vested-rights theory as a country-of-origin approach,51 
whereby the law applicable to a product or a company is determined by its 
origin, and that origin can be selected more or less freely. That idea, as a choice-
of-law principle, rests on explicitly economic considerations not dissimilar to 
those for the vested-rights theory, especially the desire to lower costs arising 
from having to deal with multiple legal systems.52 
In view of this close proximity, it is not surprising how many of the 
proposals made from the private-law model repeat solutions of the First 
Restatement:53 predictable rules,54 application of lex loci for tort liability without 
 
 48. Joseph Beale, Social Justice and Business Costs, 49 HARV. L. REV. 593, 608 (1936). For 
discussion, see id. at 604–08. 
 49. Id. at 609. Beale’s affinity to economics and social thought is occasionally recognized. For 
conflict of laws, see Riles, supra note 4, at 977–82. More generally, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The 
Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 401 (citing to the request for 
courts to use more economics, in J. BEALE & B. WYMAN, THE LAW OF RAILROAD RATE 
REGULATION 24–40 (1906)). This early book makes it unlikely that Beale endorsed economic 
considerations only after publication of the Restatement, as suggested by Ibrahim J. Wani, Borrowing 
Statutes, Statutes of Limitation and Modern Law, 57 UMKC L. REV. 681, 696 n.84 (1989). 
 50. For a defense of Pigou by a legal historian, see Brian A.W. Simpson, Coase v. Pigou 
Reexamined, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (1996). Coase’s harsh response is preceded by a quote from Stigler: 
“it takes an economist to read an economist.” R.H. Coase, Law and Economics and A.W. Brian 
Simpson, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 103 (1996). 
 51. For similarities, see Michaels, supra note 45. 
 52. See, e.g., COPENHAGEN ECONOMICS, THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE COUNTRY OF 
ORIGIN PRINCIPLE IN THE PROPOSED SERVICES DIRECTIVE—FINAL REPORT 10 (2005), 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file22901.pdf. An additional justification—impact on regulatory 
competition—belongs to the combination model and will be discussed infra II.C. 
 53. See generally William M. Richman, The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws on the Twenty-
Fifth Anniversary of its Successor: Contemporary Practice in Traditional Courts, 56 MD. L. REV. 1196, 
1197–1200 (1997). 
 54. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1188; Rühl, supra note 8, at 840; Schäfer & Lantermann, 
supra note 32, at 90–92; WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 44. 
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distinction between loss-allocation and conduct-regulation,55 opposition to 
general questions like characterization,56 renvoi,57 and a public-policy 
exception.58 Indeed, sometimes the First Restatement itself is proposed as an 
economically superior solution to choice-of-law problems.59 And this proposal is 
quite implausible. Whatever the advantages of the First Restatement may be in 
the abstract, it did not stand the test of time. Yet, although economics prides 
itself as an empirical science, the private-law model has not developed a 
response to the factual failure of the First Restatement. 
B. International-Law Models 
Almost diametrically opposed to this private-law model is a second model. 
Supported in particular by Joel Trachtman, it can be called an “international-
law model” because it extends the economics of international law into choice of 
law. Methodologically, this model is in many ways similar to the private-law 
model. Like the private-law model, the international-law model assumes that 
actors are rational in the sense that they maximize their own utilities; its 
normative goal is efficiency; and the instrument to achieve efficiency consists in 
rules that set optimal incentives for the actors or that mimic contractual 
agreements between them, ensuring that they engage in efficient (and refrain 
from inefficient) conduct. The decisive difference between this model and that 
of private law is that the actors in question are not individuals; they are states.60 
In this model, choice-of-law rules must be shaped so as to enable states, not 
individuals, to maximize the sum of their interests. States maximize the 
effectiveness of their own policies as embodied, especially, in their legislation.61 
Analogizing jurisdiction to property, Trachtman asks us to allocate prescriptive 
jurisdiction with the state that cares most about a particular problem. The 
consequence of such an allocation is that the role of party autonomy is very 
limited. 
Unlike the private-law model, the international-law model draws more 
explicitly on a doctrinal model: governmental-interest analysis, as established by 
 
 55. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1217; WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 96–97 (without 
discussion). 
 56. Infra III.B. 
 57. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1197. 
 58. Id. at 1194–95. 
 59. Erin O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Interest Groups, Contracts and Interest Analysis, 48 MERCER 
L. REV. 765, 768–69 (1997); William H. Allen & Erin A. O’Hara, Second Generation Law and 
Economics of Conflict of Laws: Baxter’s Comparative Impairment and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1011, 
1043–47 (1999). 
 60. BRILMAYER, supra note 8, at 7; Sykes, supra note 7, at 762; Joel P. Trachtman, The 
Methodology of Law and Economics in International Law, 6 INTERNATIONAL LAW FORUM DU DROIT 
INT’L 67 (2004). For discussion of whether this is compatible with methodological individualism, see 
Ralf Michaels, Two Economists Three Opinions? Economic Models for Private International Law–
Cross-Border Torts as Example, in BASEDOW & KONO, supra note 5, 143, at 163–65; Trachtman, 
Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 21–23. 
 61. See Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 15–23. 
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Brainerd Currie.62 Governmental-interest analysis assumes that conflicts of law 
are conflicts among sovereigns over which of them gets to regulate a specific 
conduct. Although interest analysis has been influential, Currie’s own position 
that forum law should usually be applied63 has not found many followers. Most 
courts and scholars suggest some degree of balancing between laws, at least 
when they are in true conflict. 
This debate is not usually presented as an economic one, but it easily can be. 
Translated, Currie’s much-maligned preference for application of forum law 
becomes an application of Pareto efficiency. If, as is the case for Currie, the 
application of forum law provides the initial assignment of jurisdiction,64 then 
the move to another state of affairs—application of foreign law—is justified, 
according to the Pareto definition of efficiency, only under two conditions: 
First, the move makes no state worse off, and, second, the move makes at least 
one state better off. The first condition excludes the move in all cases in which 
the forum has an interest in the application of its law. It follows that forum law 
applies in false conflicts when only the forum is interested and in true conflicts 
when both states are interested. The second condition excludes the application 
of foreign law in “unprovided-for” cases—cases in which neither the forum nor 
the other state is interested in their laws’ being applied. In such a case, 
application of the foreign law would make no state worse off, but it would also 
make no state better off. Foreign law applies only in false conflicts when the 
forum is disinterested and the other state is interested, the only case in which 
the move to foreign law is Pareto efficient. This is Currie’s result, too. 
Such (simple) economic reasoning underlies not only Currie’s variant of 
interest analysis. The resistance to Currie’s preference for applying forum law 
can be translated as resistance to Pareto efficiency, in accordance with 
dissatisfaction among many law-and-economic scholars with this criterion. 
Globally, Currie’s forum preference leads to the mutually suboptimal result that 
most states usually apply their own law, a situation that can be (and often is) 
presented as a prisoners’ dilemma.65 Among the many proposals to overcome 
this dilemma, one has a decidedly economic flair: Baxter’s comparative-
impairment theory.66 Baxter proposed to resolve true conflicts not by simple 
 
 62. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 16. 
 63. For the clearest exposition of this theory, see Brainerd Currie, Notes in Methods and Objectives 
in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, reprinted in BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177–87 (1963). 
 64. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 64, at 46–48, 183. 
 65. BRILMAYER, supra note 8, at 181; William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 
HARV. INT’L L. J. 161, 219–26 (2001); Kramer, supra note 8, at 280; O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 
1182; Joel P. Trachtman, Externalities and Extraterritoriality: The Law and Economics of Prescriptive 
Jurisdiction, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPARATIVE AND EMPIRICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 642, 662–63 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan O. Sykes, eds. 1997). 
 66. William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963). For 
economic reformulation (and critique), see Allen & O’Hara, supra note 59; Trachtman, Conflict of 
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preference of the forum law (as Currie had suggested), but rather with a view 
toward which state’s policy would be more seriously impaired if it were not 
enforced. To reach this result, he effectively used three common economic 
instruments that show his differences from Currie. Baxter’s first economic 
instrument was the hypothetical Coasean bargain:67 if the states could negotiate 
over who gets to regulate, jurisdiction would always end up in the state with the 
greater interest. In the presence of high transaction costs, however, such 
transactions do not take place, so we must give jurisdiction to that state from 
the start. One justification for the preference of one state’s interests over those 
of another is found in Baxter’s second move, which was, effectively, to replace 
Currie’s focus on Pareto efficiency with Kaldor–Hicks efficiency. In 
comparative impairment, one state can be made worse off (through 
nonapplication of its laws) if the loss to that state is more than outweighed by 
the gain to another state by enforcement of that latter state’s laws.68 Another 
justification lies in Baxter’s third move, which was to slightly change the 
conditions of Currie’s game-theoretical model. Currie had focused essentially 
on a one-shot game, in which it is rational for each state not to cooperate. 
However, in repeat games a certain degree of cooperation is mutually 
beneficial.69 Applied to choice of law, this suggests that if each state is willing to 
give up jurisdiction to other states, in the long run all states will profit.70 
The point here is not that traditional doctrine actually qualifies as 
sophisticated economic analysis. The traditional doctrine does not go much 
beyond this in terms of economics and resolves specific conflicts with case-
specific doctrine. The economic model, by contrast, expands greatly on the 
doctrine and introduces additional economic ideas in order to better understand 
the bargaining process: information asymmetries (where one party has 
information that the other lacks), the theory of muddy entitlements (according 
to which property rights are not fully defined ex ante), and the theory of the 
 
Laws, supra note 8, at 1017–22. Antoine Pillet had developed a similar idea in France forty years 
earlier. See ANTOINE PILLET, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT INT’L PRIVÉ 106 (1923): 
The way to resolve conflicts is to give preference to the law of the state which has the greatest 
interest that the goal pursued by the law in question be attained . . . , that its law regulate the 
litigation. If a sacrifice must be made, it should be as small as possible (translation by author). 
The similarity between Pillet and Baxter is occasionally recognized in North America. See, e.g., 
FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 141 (special ed. 2005); William 
Tetley, A Canadian Looks at American Conflict of Law Theory and Practice, Especially in the Light of 
the American Legal and Social Systems, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 299, 314 n.47 (2000); Trachtman, 
Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 26 n.91. 
 67. Baxter, supra note 66, at 7–11; cf. Allen & O’Hara, supra note 59, at 1021. 
 68. Cf. Baxter, supra note 66, at 17–18 (“The principle is to subordinate, in the particular case, the 
external objective of the state whose internal objective will be least impaired in general scope and 
impact by subordination in cases like the one at hand.”). 
 69. The most famous formulation of this insight can be found in ROBERT AXELROD, THE 
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). For an earlier formulation, see MICHAEL TAYLOR, ANARCHY 
AND COOPERATION (1976). 
 70. Baxter, supra note 66, at 10–11. For doubts as to the workability of this approach, see 
BRILMAYER, supra note 8, at 193–96; Kramer, supra note 8, at 299–300. 
MICHAELS__BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC 10/27/2008  7:54:45 AM 
Summer 2008] ECONOMICS OF LAW AS CHOICE OF LAW 85 
 
nature of the firm. The point is that, despite its greater economic sophistication, 
the economic model is largely an extension of the doctrine, not an independent 
analysis. For this reason, the economic model shares the weaknesses of the 
doctrinal model, in particular the most urgent problem with governmental-
interest analysis: the difficulty of determining what actually constitutes 
governmental interests, and the manipulability of the concept. This problem has 
plagued scholars of governmental interests since the theory’s inception; it 
provides perhaps the strongest point of criticism in the doctrine. Yet the 
problem is ignored, or assumed away, in economic models. 
C. Combined Models 
A third set of economic models can be called “combined models” because 
they combine the private- and the international-law models. For combined 
models, suggested most explicitly by Andrew Guzman, the interests to be 
maximized are those of individuals: choice of law should maximize global 
welfare as calculated between individuals. However, the focus on the incentives 
of choice-of-law rules is not only on individuals, but also on states as creators of 
substantive laws. Rational states are assumed to care, in their lawmaking, only 
for the effects these laws have on their own citizens; effects on other states’ 
citizens are externalities. This means that states will allow globally inefficient 
transactions if they are locally beneficial, and they will prohibit transactions that 
would be globally efficient if they would be locally detrimental.71 Strict 
extraterritoriality is inefficient because it enables states to externalize costs 
from their laws; strict territoriality is inefficient because it prevents states from 
regulating conduct taking place outside their borders even if that conduct harms 
them. 
A combination of private and international aspects is of course common in 
choice-of-law doctrine. Most choice-of-law methods are not purely private or 
public; they combine public and private considerations and differ in the weight 
they give to each of these. The Second Restatement72 is a prime example of a 
mixed approach. Its central provision, Section 6, combines public-law-model 
factors73 and private-law-model factors74 with factors arising from the specific 
cross-border situations.75 The European choice-of-law regulations provide 
comparable combinations: most of their rules are based on a private-law model, 
but they contain exceptions, in accordance with governmental-interest 
 
 71. Guzman, supra note 8, at 899–900. 
 72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1969). 
 73. These factors are (a) the needs of the interstate and international system, (b) the relevant 
policies of the forum, and (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of 
those states in the determination of the particular issue. 
 74. These factors are (d) the protection of justified expectations and (f) certainty, predictability, 
and uniformity of result. 
 75. These factors are (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law and (g) ease in 
determination and application of the law to be applied. 
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analysis.76 In this sense, nearly all existing doctrines would fall under the 
combined model. However, their translation into economics would present 
problems precisely because they are so mixed and eclectic.77 Because the 
relationship between the underlying policies is unclear, so are its economics. 
This may explain why economic analyses have all but ignored the Second 
Restatement,78 although it represents the most widely used approach to choice 
of law in the United States. (By contrast, Savignyan choice-of-law ideas, central 
to continental European thinking, are being translated into an economic model 
by Giesela Rühl, who emphasizes deliberate neutrality toward the substance of 
potentially applicable law.79) 
Recently, however, writings on choice of law have gone beyond presenting a 
mishmash or eclectic mix and have explicitly addressed this clash of public and 
private policies in a more systematic manner. Robert Wai has presented a 
subtle interpretation of choice of law as an instrument that simultaneously 
enables and enhances private freedom and the effectuation of state policies and 
that creates both a private sphere outside of states and a “touchdown” 
relationship with states.80 For him, “the function of transnational private law is 
not simply facilitation of transactions, but also compensation for harms and 
social regulation of transnational conduct.”81 The private law in private 
international law is not only about contracts, but also about compensation and 
interests of third parties; when private parties do not bring about the right 
degree of compensation, the state must intervene.82 Although not based in 
economics (nor disinterested in the political relevance of the subject), Wai’s 
 
 76. See Erik Jayme, The American Conflicts Revolution and its Impact on European Private 
International Law, in FORTY YEARS ON: THE EVOLUTION OF POSTWAR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN EUROPE 15 (1990); Frank Vischer, New Tendencies in European Conflict of Laws and the 
Influence of the U.S. Doctrine – A Short Survey, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD: 
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 459 (James A. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides 
eds., 2002). For a more general discussion, see Ralf Michaels, The European Conflict of Laws 
Revolution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1607 (forthcoming 2008). 
 77. William A. Reppy, Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?, 34 MERCER L. 
REV. 645 (1983). 
 78. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1183–84 (claiming the Restatement “ends up sanctioning 
whatever the courts want to do”); Trachtman, Choice of Law, supra note 8, at 1012, 1016 (mentioning 
the Restatement as a balancing test). 
 79. Rühl, supra note 8; see also Giesela Rühl, Die Kosten der Rechtswahlfreiheit: Zur Anwendung 
ausländischen Rechts durch deutsche Gerichte, 71 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND 
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 559 (2007); Giesela Rühl, Party Autonomy in the Private 
International Law of Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence and Economic Efficiency, in Conflict of 
Laws in a Globalized World, in ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 153 (Gottschalk et 
al. eds., 2007). 
 80. Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of 
Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 223 (2002); Robert 
Wai, Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society, 46 HARV. INT’L L. 
J. 471 (2005); Robert Wai, The Interlegality of Private International Law, 71 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 
105 (Summer 2008). 
 81. Wai, Transnational Private Law, supra note 80, at 471. 
 82. Id. at 474–75. 
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approach rests on certain economic considerations not dissimilar to those 
suggested by Guzman. Like Guzman, Wai considers the competitive superiority 
of local over global regulatory institutions,83 the need of law to address 
externalities,84 and especially the function of private international law to 
coordinate various regulations in order to avoid both over- and 
underregulation,85 as well as regulatory competition that would enable 
opportunistic behavior by private actors.86 These ideas are present as economic 
considerations in the recent work by Muir Watt, who endorses many of Wai’s 
points and enriches them with inspirations from the economic literature.87 
What distinguishes proponents of combined models, in economics and in 
doctrine alike, is their respective views on the desirability of regulatory 
competition and party autonomy. For Guzman, choice-of-law rules should 
guarantee that the applicable law is the law of a state that is least likely to 
externalize the costs of its legislation, for that law is likely to be closest to a 
globally optimal law. This makes it necessary to determine the applicable law 
objectively on the basis of effects; domicile plays only a limited role, and the 
place of conduct plays no role at all. Party autonomy is desirable only when 
transaction costs have no third-party effects.88 By contrast, proponents of 
regulatory competition find an argument for party autonomy even when third-
party externalities may exist. Party autonomy is advocated as an instrument to 
force states to abolish inefficient laws. The idea, in a nutshell, is that states will 
compete in a market for laws for parties to choose their laws.89 In order to 
prevail in this market, the theory goes, states must provide efficient laws—laws 
that benefit greatly and cost little. Analysts of jurisdictional or regulatory 
competition have long all but ignored choice-of-law rules; lately, regulatory 
competition has been used more explicitly as a principle for choice-of-law 
rules.90 
D. The Best Law 
All three models face the question presented at the outset: What is special 
about choice of law as opposed to regular economic analysis? Why is the result 
of a choice-of-law question not simply the choice of the more efficient law, as 
 
 83. Wai, Transnational Liftoff, supra note 80, at 239, 243–44. 
 84. Id. at 251. 
 85. Id. at 253–54 (“The basic role of private international law in addressing transnational 
regulatory gaps is to coordinate the process of regulation by national authorities and national laws.”). 
 86. Id. at 254–55. 
 87. Muir Watt, supra note 6. 
 88. Guzman, supra note 8, at 913–14. 
 89. Larry E. Ribstein & Erin O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
661 (2008). 
 90. E.g., Horatia Muir Watt, Concurrence d’ordres juridiques et conflits de lois de droit privé, in LE 
DROIT INT’L PRIVE: ESPRIT ET METHODES: MELANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE PAUL LAGARDE 615, 
625–33 (2005); Francisco J. Garcimartín Alférez, Regulatory Competition: A Private International Law 
Approach, 8 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 251 (1999). 
MICHAELS__BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC 10/27/2008  7:54:45 AM 
88 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 71:73 
 
economic analysis of domestic law would suggest? Such an approach is indeed 
known in choice-of-law doctrine as “better law theory”—the idea that the judge 
should apply the better of the two laws. “Better” is defined at least in part in 
economic terms, as “superiority of one rule of law over another in terms of 
socio-economic jurisprudential standards.”91 In other words, the judges should 
apply the law that is the best from an economic perspective—if efficiency is the 
criterion, then they should choose the most efficient law. Under this approach, 
economic analysis of substantive law would immediately offer itself as a choice-
of-law doctrine. 
The better-law approach is the direct translation of normative economics 
into choice of law. Courts have occasionally used it as such, and have based the 
preference of one state’s rules on comparative negligence over the other state’s 
rules on contributory negligence explicitly on the (alleged) economic 
superiority of a comparative-negligence regime.92 So it is not surprising that 
nearly all economic analyses address the theory. What is surprising, at first, is 
that proponents of all three models reject the approach. Indeed, this is so 
although every one of these models has a very specific idea of the role of the 
“best law” in choice of law. Simply substituting determination of the best law 
for the choice-of-law analysis would mean that choice of law would be no 
different from substantive law. At the same time, the goal of efficiency or 
welfare maximization makes it necessary to formulate the best law as the goal 
of the analysis. The struggle from choice-of-law doctrine between substantive 
justice and conflicts justice is not resolved; it is merely transposed into a 
struggle between substantive efficiency and conflicts efficiency. 
Why “better law” is not a solution for the international-law model is 
obvious: if law is the effectuation of government policies, then this 
determination cannot be undermined by invocation of some otherwise-
determined best law.93 The best law must be determined by the (democratically 
legitimated) legislator, not by the judge or the economist (or by private parties). 
Respect for autonomy of states (which would translate within doctrine into 
respect for sovereignty) makes judgments about the best substantive laws 
 
 91. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 
296 (1966). See also Heath v. Zellmer, 151 N.W.2d 664, 673–76 (Wis. 1967); Diesel Service Co. v. 
AMBAC Intern. Corp., 961 F.2d 635, 643 (7th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Generac Corp. 
v. Caterpillar Inc., 172 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 92. See McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 S.2d 303, 316–17 (Miss. 1989) (applying Tennessee rule of 
comparative negligence over the common-law rule of contributory negligence of another state with the 
most significant relationship, because the Tennessee rule is “demonstrably superior . . . [b]oth from the 
point of view of civil justice and economic efficiency . . . .”); Threlkeld v. Worsham, 30 Ark. App. 251, 
255–56 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990) (applying the same reasoning as the Court in McDaniel). Ironically, the 
main proponent of the better-law approach himself had some sympathy for contributory over 
comparative negligence. See Robert A. Leflar, Comments on Maki v. Frelk—Comparative v. 
Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 918 (1968). The 
economic debate is less clear than the decisions suggest. For a recent perspective, see Oren Bar-Gill & 
Omri Ben-Shahar, The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 439 (2003). 
 93. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 42. 
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undesirable. Trachtman invokes Kegel’s preference of “conflicts justice over 
substantive justice”94 and thus assumes (though without real argument) one 
position within the hotly fought doctrinal debate between conflicts justice and 
substantive justice. 
By contrast, rejection from the private-law model is prima facie surprising.95 
When such rejection is not due to a misunderstanding of the better-law theory 
as focusing on justice instead of efficiency,96 the main arguments against a 
better-law approach are that judges would not be up to the task of assessing 
efficiency97 or that “[r]esolving a choice of law problem by applying the efficient 
law will only have the desired effects on accident precaution if parties expect 
the law to apply.”98 These arguments prove more than they want to. If judges 
cannot assess efficiency, and if parties cannot expect an efficiency standard to 
apply, then judges should not engage in efficiency analysis within substantive 
law either—for example by applying the Learned Hand formula to determine 
negligence. And, of course, they should not use efficiency as a criterion to 
develop choice-of-law rules either. Moreover, if judges are unable to assess the 
best law, it is not clear why either the parties themselves or the maker of choice-
of-law rules should be better equipped. Ultimately, rejection of the better-law 
approach is based more on a question-begging definition of the problem than 
on fully fledged efficiency analysis: “the situation we are studying is not the 
formulation of tort rules, but the selection between them in order to resolve a 
conflict of laws.”99 
The most interesting rejection is that made by the combined model. 
Guzman rejects the better-law approach with a combination of the arguments 
brought forward under the other two models: judges are ill-equipped to 
determine the better law (a private-law-model argument), and the competing 
policies so determined may be incommensurable (an international-law 
argument).100 But then it turns out that his rejection is based on a 
misunderstanding of the better-law theory as either focusing on justice and 
reasonability101 or as necessarily leading to a forum bias.102 And Guzman himself 
 
 94. Id. at 42 n.110; cf. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws, supra note 8, at 889 n. 45, 995–96. 
 95. See, e.g., Peter Mankowski, Europäisches Internationales Privat- und Prozessrecht im Lichte der 
ökonomischen Analyse, in VEREINHEITLICHUNG UND DIVERSITÄT DES ZIVILRECHTS IN 
TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRÄUMEN 118, 127  (Ott & Schäfer eds., 2002); O’Hara & Ribstein, 
supra note 8, at 1178–80; WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 25; WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 
21–22 (generally), 90 (with regard to tort law). But see Kramer, supra note 8, at 339; Solimine, supra 
note 5, at 215 (arguing that the emphasis on efficiency in economic analyses of choice of law suggests a 
better law approach). 
 96. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 21; Guzman, supra note 8, at 893. 
 97. Allen & O’Hara, supra note 59, at 1030–31; Guzman, supra note 8, at 893; O’Hara & Ribstein, 
supra note 8, at 1178–80. 
 98. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 90. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Guzman, supra note 8, at 893–94, 896. 
 101. Id. at 893. For a similar misunderstanding, see WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 21. 
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requires an idea of the better law when he establishes “the globally efficient 
substantive law” as the goal.103 Judges are unable to find it, but economic 
analysis outside the courtroom can nonetheless set it as an ideal. 
III 
ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS AS DOCTRINAL SOLUTIONS 
The economic models are more similar to existing doctrine than is usually 
admitted. If this is so, it must be possible to evaluate the answers they give to 
specific doctrinal problems. Most doctrines can be translated into economic 
models but become quite unconvincing as economics. Translated into 
economics, stripped of all its peculiarities, doctrine turns into very bland, 
straightforward, and unsatisfactory models. The economic models are 
undoubtedly superior in their economics, but does this mean they can also claim 
to give more sophisticated answers to traditional problems of choice of law? 
Some such claims are somewhat implausible, for example, the idea that a return 
to the First Restatement and its rules would create an advantage.104 Others are 
less novel than their proponents present them, for example, the insight that 
Hartford Fire involved an actual conflict.105 But the models do provide responses 
to specific questions, and this is where they should be tested. As the analysis 
shows, the results are of limited use for doctrine. Specific subject matters prove 
to be too complex for meaningful economic guidance. General problems like 
characterization do not become dispensable. Debates on the optimal design of 
choice-of-law rules replicate similar debates in doctrine. Translated into 
doctrine, the economic analysis looks very bland. 
A. Specific Subject Matters: Transboundary Tort Liability 
One good example of a specific subject matter is the problem of 
transboundary torts.106 The main problem here is whether the law of the place of 
conduct or the law of the place of injury should govern. Some economists in a 
 
 102. Id. at 896–97. Although the relation to forum bias is an empirical reality, it is not a necessary 
element of the theory. 
 103. Id. at 898. 
 104. See references supra note 59. 
 105. Guzman, supra note 8, at 886, 918–19, referring to Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 
764, 797–99 (1993). The criterion for “true conflicts” used by the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire was 
inconsistent with interest analysis, which has long admitted that, contrary to what the Supreme Court 
assumed, states may also have an interest in permitting certain conduct. The decision in Hartford Fire 
rested on a misunderstanding of the Restatement for International Law. See Andreas Lowenfeld, 
Conflict, Balance of Interests, and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance 
Antitrust Case, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 42, 50 (1995). See also Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 
27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003, 1059–60 (2006). 
 106. See more extensively, Michaels, supra note 60 (with further references); Antonio Nicita & 
Matteo M. Winkler, The Cost of Transnational Accidents: Evolving Rules on Torts (2007), available at 
http://www.cbs.dk/content/download/67236/929984/file/The%20cost%20of%20transnational%20accide
nts%20(Nicita-Winkler%202007).pdf. 
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private-law model prefer, at least prima facie, the place of conduct because it is 
thought to have a regulatory advantage.107 The country-of-origin principle 
likewise favors the place of conduct because this enables defendants to rely on 
just one law. Economists from an international-law model, by contrast, focus on 
the place of injury that feels the effects of the conduct. Among proponents of 
the combined model, finally, views are mixed: Guzman strongly disfavors 
relying on the law of the place of conduct because doing so would encourage 
externalization.108 Others provide a more complex analysis: If defendants must 
comply with the strict rules of their home states, they may face a competitive 
disadvantage in foreign markets; this consideration could favor preference for a 
place-of-injury rule.109 However, if defendants must comply with the strict rules 
of the place of injury, they may be unable to compete in that market because 
they face a disadvantage vis-à-vis local companies that are better equipped to 
deal with the local law. Closer analysis shows that even this discrepancy in views 
presents too simple a picture because the focus is only on the tortfeasor and his 
conduct, not on that of the victim. Taking Coase seriously requires focusing on 
both tortfeasor and victim and their respective conduct, or on place of conduct 
and place of injury and their respective laws and policies.110 
All of this makes the design of optimal choice-of-law rules such a complex 
and fact-specific analysis that workable rules are unachievable through a 
rigorous economic analysis. At some point, each analysis strikes a decision on 
the basis of intuition. The general choice of the law of either the place of 
conduct or the place of injury is made on the basis of the need for simplicity 
rather than that of economic efficiency. This brings clarity, but this clarity 
comes for the sake of grossly simplifying the cases to be solved; once specifics 
are included, their solutions are indistinguishable from those of traditional 
doctrine. 
B. General Devices: Characterization 
If economic models cannot resolve difficult specific problems, can they help 
dispense with general institutions that the doctrine still carries with it? One 
example is characterization. Traditional methods rely strongly on 
characterization—whether an issue belongs to the law of contract or tort, or 
whether it is substantive or procedural, is a relevant question to determine the 
adequate choice-of-law rule. More modern approaches have tried to reduce or 
eliminate the need to characterize, but although the methods and concepts have 
 
 107. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1217 (but ultimately preferring place of injury in order to 
minimize characterization issues). It is not obvious why, as regards choice of law (versus enforcement), 
the place of conduct should have a regulatory advantage over the place of injury. 
 108. Guzman, supra note 8, at 921–24; Schäfer & Lantermann, supra note 32, at 117–18. 
 109. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 35, at 1144–46. 
 110. See Michaels, supra note 60, at 158–60, 175–76. 
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changed, the need to characterize has remained: loss-allocating rules must be 
distinguished from conduct-regulating ones. 
Economists readily adopt the frequent critique of characterization and ask 
that economic analysis should dispel the need to characterize, for it increases 
uncertainty (and thus transaction costs).111 However, instead of avoiding 
characterization, economic models replicate it. Some writers merely avoid the 
problem, as did the First Restatement. O’Hara and Ribstein largely put 
characterization in the background and develop rules for contracts, 
corporations, and marriage, without worrying much about explaining how to 
distinguish these concepts.112 Whincop and Keyes deal with characterization on 
the level of definition.113 A similar solution is to argue at such a high level of 
abstraction that application on the ground becomes detached—when the 
distinction is between transactions with third-party externalities and 
transactions without such externalities,114 or when the focus is entirely on private 
law and we are asked to believe the claim that “most private law situations have 
few third party effects.”115 
If characterization is not assumed away, attempts are made at its 
simplification, but such attempts face the same problems as similar suggestions 
in doctrine. Some writers shift the boundaries between concepts—by rejecting 
the distinction between loss-allocating and conduct-regulating rules,116 or by 
treating “market torts” like contracts.117 This move does not abolish the need to 
distinguish categories; it merely changes the categories: now market torts must 
be distinguished from nonmarket torts. One may of course deny that this kind 
of distinction between market and nonmarket torts is a matter of 
characterization: “courts should focus on whether the parties have bargained 
with each other instead of asking whether a case involves a ‘contract’ or a 
‘tort.’”118 But not only is this still characterization, as is admitted elsewhere;119 it 
also leaves unaddressed the prior question, central to traditional doctrine, of 
why we should view market torts like contracts rather than like torts. 
Indeed, not only the need for characterization remains; we can even 
recognize traditional modes of characterization replicated as economic 
approaches. The old debate whether the objects of characterization are facts or 
rules of law, now usually considered moot, is revived when O’Hara and 
Ribstein argue that “to maximize ex ante predictability, characterization should 
 
 111. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 6–7; O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1168, 1189–90. 
 112. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1197–1221. 
 113. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 89. 
 114. Guzman, supra note 8, at 894. 
 115. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 4. 
 116. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1179–80. 
 117. Id. at 1211; WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 107–23. 
 118. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1190. 
 119. Id. at 1221. 
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be based on facts rather than legal theory.”120 The same is true for the question 
of how to characterize. If Guzman assumes that the existence vel non of third-
party externalities can be determined objectively,121 this is equivalent to 
autonomous characterization according to objective criteria. If, for Trachtman, 
“the mandatory nature of a law is an indicator, and is perhaps the best evidence, 
that the law addressed externalities in the private sector,”122 this is in essence a 
characterization lege causae—the applicable law determines its own 
categorization.123 
Economists can, for some time at least, avoid the difficulty and messiness of 
characterization because of their affinity for models: something can be assumed 
to be a contract, a relationship with third-party effects, et cetera. But the clarity 
is a mirage. Once these models are applied to the real world, they provide no 
more guidance than do the doctrinal approaches they aim at replacing. As 
models, the proposals are pure and attractive; as doctrine they are no better, 
often strikingly similar, but far less differentiated than existing doctrinal 
approaches. Doctrine is replicated as economics, but its problems are not 
resolved by the translation. 
C. Design: Rules or Standards? 
A third question to ask is whether choice-of-law solutions should be 
formulated as specific, predictable rules (as in the First Restatement), or as 
open-ended standards or approaches (as in the Second Restatement). Since the 
general economic literature has not (yet) found common ground,124 it is not 
surprising to find discrepancies among different analyses of choice of law. What 
is surprising is that these different positions on the rules-versus-standards 
question largely align with different models, although the arguments for or 
against rules or standards should normally apply similarly to transactions 
between individuals and transactions between states. Proponents of the private-
law model by and large favor clear and rigid rules as a baseline for negotiations 
and as a means to decrease uncertainty as to litigation outcomes.125 By contrast, 
Trachtman, as a proponent of the international-law model, points out the 
 
 120. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1221; see also id. at 1190 (“[T]he applicable choice-of-law 
rule should turn on facts, which are harder for courts to manipulate than legal categories.”). 
 121. See Guzman, supra note 8, at 894–95. 
 122. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 6. 
 123. For critical analysis, see Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Qualification, Classification, or 
Characterization Problem in the Conflict of Laws, 50 YALE L.J. 743 (1941). 
 124. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE. L.J. 557 (1992). 
But see Jason  Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256 
(1995). For an overview, see Louis Kaplow, General Standard of Rules, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 631–60 (Bouckaert & De Geest eds., vol. 5, 2000), available at 
http://encyclo.findlaw.com/9000book.pdf. 
 125. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1199, 1201 (contracts), 1217 (nonmarket torts), 1220–21; 
Schäfer & Lantermann, supra note 32, at 90–92; WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 25, 36–37 
(contracts). For extensive debate, see Rühl, supra note 8, at 831–40. 
MICHAELS__BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC 10/27/2008  7:54:45 AM 
94 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 71:73 
 
advantages of “muddy entitlements,”126 that allow ad hoc adaptation in the 
individual case and may provide incentives to states to bargain more effectively 
over the exact allocation of jurisdiction. 
This alignment is in accordance with traditional doctrine, in which private-
law models like the First Restatement emphasize the need for predictable rules, 
whereas governmental-interest analyses prefer open standards. Unfortunately, 
the economic models make little use of experience with these approaches. The 
First Restatement was unsuccessful in large part because its rules turned out to 
be far less predictable than intended and because the costs from inflexibility 
turned out to be too great. Furthermore, if both models view the First 
Restatement as the only possible example for rules, they ignore both the far 
more-favorable experience with rules in Europe and the U.S. experience with, 
and proposals for, new, but better, rules.127 In contrast, experience with 
governmental-interest analysis suggests issues that should be relevant for 
economic analysis, too: high transaction costs for negotiations among states 
leave muddy entitlements intact, which in turn lead to frequent forum 
preference and thus globally suboptimal outcomes. In short, existing economic 
analyses replicate the doctrinal debate, but with not much attention spent on 
experiences from that debate.128 
IV 
PRIVATE ORDERING AND PUBLIC LAW 
This analysis so far has revealed that economic models, viewed as doctrine, 
lose much of their novel character. Furthermore, as doctrine, the economic 
models propose solutions that often appear strangely to disregard the 
complexities of the problems they set out to answer. However, one thing the 
economic analyses do make clear is that the choice of one or the other model 
has implications for results—not only in doctrine, but also in economic 
reasoning. Since the central difference between a private-law model and an 
international-law model is the role of private-versus-public determination of the 
applicable law, it seems worthwhile to focus on this in detail. 
A. Private Choice and Mandatory Rules 
Emphasis on party autonomy is sometimes promoted as a decisive 
contribution from economic analysis. This is a little exaggerated: party 
 
 126. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 45–46. 
 127. SYMEON SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT 
AND FUTURE 425–37 (2006); William M. Richman, Review Essay: A New Breed of Smart Empirically-
Derived Conflicts Rules: Better Law Than “Better Law” in the Post-Tort-Reform Era, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
2181 (forthcoming 2008). 
 128. An exception is Rühl, supra note 8. 
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autonomy has long been accepted as a basis for choice of law in contracts.129 One 
eminent conflicts scholar has voiced her surprise as to why law and economics 
even bothers to prove the efficiency of party autonomy.130 And, indeed, the two 
limits to party autonomy that economists name—negative third-party 
externalities and information asymmetries—are mirrored in the traditional 
constraints to party autonomy regarding so-called internationally mandatory 
rules131 and regarding specific kinds of contracts with structurally weaker parties: 
consumer contracts, employment contracts, and insurance contracts.132 
Differences are only those between rule and exception. For the private-law 
model, party determination of the applicable law should be a cornerstone of 
choice of law;133 where neither third-party externalities nor information 
asymmetries exist between the parties, the parties should be permitted to 
choose the law that governs their relationship.134 For the international-law 
model, objective determination of the applicable law is the rule, but “[i]f the 
governmental interest is reduced substantially enough, then a rule of party 
autonomy may be followed.”135 
Whether party autonomy should be the rule or the exception is not entirely 
unimportant. For example, the private-law model successfully suggests that we 
should enforce contractual choice more often. It does so by shifting our 
attention to the relatively unproblematic, bilateral relationship between two 
 
 129. See REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON THE LAW 
APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS (Rome I) art. 3, available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st03/st03691.en07.pdf; UCC § 1-105 (2001); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 187 (1971); PETER NYGH, AUTONOMY IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 8–14 (1999); Mathias Reimann, Savigny’s Triumph, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 
571 (1999); Rühl, Party Autonomy, supra note 79, at 155–58. For party autonomy in other areas of the 
law than contract, see Dorothee Einsele, Rechtswahlfreiheit im Internationalen Privatrecht, 60 
RABELSZ 417 (1996); Jan von Hein, Rechtswahlfreiheit im Internationalen Deliktsrecht, 64 RABELSZ 
595, 603–06 (2000); see also Peter Nygh, The Reasonable Expectations of the Parties as a Guide to the 
Choice of Law in Contract and in Tort, 251 RECUEIL DES COURS  269 (1995). 
 130. Muir Watt, supra note 8, at 688. 
 131. REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON THE LAW 
APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS (Rome I) art. 9, available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st03/st03691.en07.pdf. The term “mandatory rules” is 
unfamiliar in U.S. law, but the reasoning is essentially the same. Patrick J. Borchers, Categorical 
Exceptions to Party Autonomy in Private International Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). 
 132. Borchers, supra note 131. 
 133. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 5–6 and passim; O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1185. 
See also Kirchner, supra note 11; Schäfer & Lantermann, supra note 32, at 92. For a positive analysis of 
the rise of party autonomy, see Ribstein, supra note 43. 
 134. Erin A. O’Hara, Economics, Public Choice, and the Perennial Conflict of Laws, 90 GEO. L.J. 
941, 943 (2002). 
 135. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 64; see id. at 20 (“Given this focus on 
governmental preferences, where such preferences are not implicated substantially, either as evidenced 
by the fact that the law at issue is merely facultative, or because the international setting so attenuates 
the governmental preferences, . . . it would seem appropriate to allow private parties to determine the 
governing law.”). 
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rational actors,136 and away from the messy problems of what is euphemistically 
called “third-party externalities,” and which comprises everything that is 
problematic for choice of law for contracts. The international-law model in 
contrast, by focusing on policy conflicts between states, suggests that third-party 
externalities are usually implicated, so party autonomy retains a relatively small 
space. 
However, these are not substantive differences. Such substantive differences 
emerge once more controversial issues are addressed. The challenging question 
is not whether parties can choose the applicable law in general, but whether 
they can, by so doing, avoid application of rules that would normally be 
mandatory. Traditional doctrine has developed relatively subtle (and somewhat 
unpredictable) criteria to distinguish norms that are internally mandatory (and 
that can be evaded through choice of another law) from norms that are 
internationally mandatory (and that apply even if the parties choose another 
law). Economists have fewer scruples about suggesting broad solutions. Here, 
the models differ significantly. 
Proponents of a private-law model propose that such choice should be 
widely possible, except where a legislature explicitly provides for an 
internationally mandatory character.137 Sometimes this is explained as a direct 
consequence of viewing party autonomy as a mere extension of freedom of 
contract.138 Yet this would not explain why party autonomy, as a mere extension 
of freedom of contract, should supervene such rules that could not be avoided 
through mere freedom of contract.139 The stronger argument is that such 
mandatory laws are to be avoided precisely because they are binding 
domestically: “If tort rules are mandatory on a domestic basis, choices of 
foreign law are the only way to contract on other, preferred terms.”140 From this 
perspective, there is no reason to confine party autonomy to contract law. 
Indeed, it has been proposed for other areas of private law like tort law, 
 
 136. For the complexity of even this relationship, see Fleur Johns, Performing Party Autonomy, 71 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243 (Summer 2008). 
 137. For this exception, see O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1184, 1199–1200; WHINCOP & 
KEYES, supra note 5, at 61. 
 138. E.g., Richard A. Posner, Foreword, in WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at xiv, xv: 
[T]he choice of law to be applied to contract disputes should be regarded a s simply an 
extension of the parties’ decision regarding what terms to include in their contract. Choice of 
law is just another term. If they specify a choice of law, it should be honored even if . . . the 
choice is to circumvent the mandatory rule of a jurisdiction the law of which would otherwise 
apply. 
This is an extension of contract law only if contract law is about freedom of contract, not about its 
limits. 
 139. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 8, at 329 (“[P]roposing that parties should always be free to 
choose the law that governs their contract . . . would be tantamount to repealing the law of contract by 
enabling parties to opt out of any limitation not imposed by every state or nation in the world.”). 
 140. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 78. Cf. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1152, 1154–55. 
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regulatory law like securities law141 or antitrust law,142 and even noneconomic law 
like marriage, including same-sex marriage.143 More importantly, perhaps, the 
argument is not necessarily confined to international transactions. The 
traditional distinction between different types of mandatory rules applies only 
to international cases; in purely domestic contracts, application of domestic law 
has nothing arbitrary, and consequently party autonomy is excluded.144 But if, 
indeed, mandatory rules are presumably inefficient and party autonomy leads 
to efficient contracts and efficient laws, then there is no reason to reserve it to 
transnational actors. Individuals may suffer from inefficient laws in purely local 
transactions, too. This suggests that the freedom to choose the applicable law 
over mandatory domestic norms should be granted even in purely domestic 
contracts.145 At this point, there is no difference between choice of law and 
general freedom of contract. What starts as choice of law ends up as a radical 
transformation and privatization of domestic law. 
In contrast, proponents of an international model are quite opposed to 
parties’ freedom to evade any mandatory rules through private choice of law. In 
such models, party autonomy is usually not even considered. Insofar as private 
international law is conceived of only as conflicts between states over the right 
to regulate a certain conduct, parties do not even enter the picture as relevant 
actors. (This matches the opposition to party autonomy in governmental 
analysis.)146 In Joel Trachtman’s words, “[T]he mandatory nature of a law is an 
indicator, and is perhaps the best evidence, that the law addressed externalities 
in the private sector.”147 As a consequence, domestically mandatory rules should 
be treated, prima facie, as internationally mandatory rules: “In fact, in 
circumstances of mandatory law, where we assume externalities domestically, it 
is appropriate to assume the existence of interstate externalities.” Here, the 
 
 141. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Recognition: Rethinking the International 
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); Roberta Romano, Empowering 
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998); Roberta Romano, 
The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 387 
(2001). For criticism, see Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice 
Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999); Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a 
Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498 (1998); Merrit B. Fox, The 
Issuer Choice Debate, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 563 (2001); Horatia Muir Watt, Choice of 
Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets: A Matter of Political Economy, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 383 
(2003). 
 142. Choi & Guzman, supra note 141; Guzman, supra note 8. 
 143. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1209 (with an exception for noncontractual aspects like 
marriage subsidies and parenting rights, borrowed from F.H. Buckley & Larry Ribstein, Calling a Truce 
in the Marriage Wars,  2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 561, 598–99 (2001)). 
 144. REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL ON THE LAW 
APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 15 (Dec. 15, 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAW § 187 cmt. d (1971); Rühl, Party Autonomy, supra note 79, at 159–60. 
 145. Gerhard Wagner, The Virtues of Diversity in European Private Law, in THE NEED FOR A 
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 3, 14–15 (Jan Smits ed., 2005); Rühl, Party Autonomy, supra note 79, at 
179. 
 146. See CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 63, at 732–33. 
 147. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 6. 
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opposite happens from what occurred in the private-law model: wherever 
domestically mandatory rules are in play, party autonomy no longer has a role. 
Party autonomy does not go beyond ordinary contractual freedom. 
B. The Collapse Into Domestic Law 
There is an extreme difference between giving the parties the ability to 
avoid all mandatory rules of domestic law and letting mandatory rules always 
trump. Given the importance of these strong normative claims, we should 
expect proponents of one or the other model to give considerable attention to 
the question of which model to choose. Yet what we find are largely ad hoc 
appeals to common sense. 
Whincop and Keyes, for example, argue that “as befits a theory of private 
international law, we emphasise parties and party interests.”148 But why would 
private international law not equally suggest an international-law model? And 
what model would befit a discipline called conflict of laws? More importantly, 
why would private law be only about individual interests?149 Why would its main 
function not be the restriction of private autonomy? 
Joel Trachtman offers the opposite argument for the international-law 
model simply by using a different definition of private law. For him, “if choice 
of law and prescriptive jurisdiction is not about governmental preferences, then 
it is not about law, as law is the expression of governmental preferences.”150 
Although, for the private-law model, all good law is private, for the 
international-law model, all law is public. The distinction between private law 
and public law is moot151 and “must be replaced by a more subtle metric,”152 
which turns out to be between the state and the market; and because law is 
provided by the state as a public good,153 all law is public law.154 But even if all 
law is public law, why must it necessarily trump individual autonomy, especially 
in international transactions? 
Not only are these questions unanswered; the exchange suggests that what 
lies at the heart of the differences between these models is nothing less than a 
debate about the role of law. That debate, important as it is, has little to do with 
private international law; it is a debate about substantive law. The tension 
between mandatory state norms and private ordering, well known as a central 
theme from private law, usually takes on a decisively different character once it 
is addressed as a problem of choice of law, as the difficult distinction between 
 
 148. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 4 (emphasis in original). 
 149. For different uses of private law, see Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the 
State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843, 846–53 (2006). For the 
idea that private law is about private interests, see id. at 847–48. 
 150. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 21, 77. 
 151. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws, supra note 8, at 1035. 
 152. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 5. 
 153. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws, supra note 8, at 1045. 
 154. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 21. 
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different kinds of mandatory rules shows. For most economic models, such 
difficult distinctions hardly exist. Instead, each of these two models simply 
extrapolates one side of the tension—the private side or the state side—and 
builds its entire choice-of-law approach on that side. For proponents of the 
private-law model, mandatory rules are generally bad: “The primary 
justification for mandatory rules may come from interest group effects or 
violations of standard economic assumptions.”155 The international-law model, 
in sharp contrast, simply assumes, “heroically,” that mandatory rules represent 
common interests.156 Public-choice problems with the creation of substantive law 
either are ignored (because it would be “immodest for prescriptive jurisdiction 
and choice of law rules to take this concern into account”157) or cannot be 
helped by choice of law.158 
These assessments are, remarkably, as general as they are radical. The 
differentiated (if ultimately unsatisfactory) way in which the doctrine of choice 
of law distinguishes rules that are mandatory in the international sense from 
those that are mandatory in a purely domestic sense is lost. Even more 
amazingly, these assessments on the quality of mandatory rules are based 
almost entirely on assumptions. 
These assumptions are crucial elements for each model. If a state legislator 
makes a norm mandatory, it may do so for various reasons. The legislator may 
consider the norm necessary to prevent third-party externalities it may consider 
the norm efficient between the parties, or it may aim at goals other than 
efficiency—paternalism, for example. If states are the players, as they are in the 
international-law model, then this determination is by definition rational. By 
contrast, if individuals are the players, as is the case in the private-law model, 
such norms are presumably inefficient because they cannot account for different 
individuals’ heterogeneous preferences and because they are frequently the 
inefficient result of special-interest-group lobbying. In other words, for models 
to be internally coherent and consistent, it is important to externalize difficult 
questions from the research. 
At the same time, these questions are relevant not specifically for choice of 
law but for domestic law. Whether mandatory rules are good or bad depends 
crucially on whether they represent considerations of general welfare or 
whether they merely represent the interests of special groups. This is a problem 
of public choice on the one hand and democratic legitimacy on the other. As 
such, it is obviously central to the legitimacy of law and extremely hard to 
answer in the abstract. But the argument, from the private-law model and the 
international-law model alike, that these questions cannot be answered from a 
 
 155. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 54. 
 156. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 16. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. (“[I]t would leave bad law in place when there are no cross-border connections, and 
eviscerate good law when there are cross-border connections.”). 
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choice-of-law perspective, seems disingenuous if the entire models rely on 
them. The opposite seems true: the respective models are responses, albeit 
quite radical and crude ones, to precisely this question. 
It does not seem to be too much of a stretch to say that the private-law 
model of choice of law is not only an extension of substantive private law,159 but 
that it also represents a position within debates on substantive law. Choice of 
law and, especially, party autonomy are used primarily not just to determine the 
most appropriate law but as a way to circumvent undue restrictions on freedom 
of contract stemming from mandatory law.160 Traditionally, the limits to the 
creation of mandatory law have been the domain not of choice of law but of the 
political process. Now party autonomy is established as an equivalent substitute 
for democratic determination of the applicable law—not as a theoretical and 
rhetorical trope but as a concrete reality.161 Yet party determination of the 
applicable law in purely domestic contracts is hardly an issue of choice of law; it 
is an issue of the relationship between the state and the private. Governance 
becomes entirely private governance; states are no more than inconvenient 
obstacles to be circumvented. 
The opposite move can be seen in the international-law model. Tellingly, 
this model views choice of law as a mere subset of international law, and 
questions of the conflict between laws are not essentially different from 
conflicts between different policies more generally. For Trachtman, “the 
problems of choice of law and prescriptive jurisdiction . . . address the problem 
of the horizontal scope of state power.”162 The vertical scope of state power over 
individuals is ignored. In an international-law model in which states are viewed 
as unitary actors, the problem of inefficient domestic rules cannot exist because 
those disadvantaged by such norms, private parties, are simply absent from the 
analysis, or rather, their interests are subsumed into those of states. As a 
consequence, wherever policies exist, actors are by definition prevented from 
opting out of them. The political idea behind this, even if not spelled out 
explicitly, is one of global governance as exclusively public governance, a cartel 
of states that allocate jurisdiction among themselves, but collectively protect 
themselves against manipulation by individuals. 
 
 159. See text accompanying note 138. 
 160. For their own mistrust in mandatory rules, see WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 52–68. 
Elsewhere, WHINCOP & KEYES argue that “[p]arty autonomy is not desirable simply for liberal 
reasons, but because it provides an opportunity to limit the consequences of rules that are sometimes 
wrong.” It is hard to see how the reason they name—the preference of private ordering over public 
regulation—is not “simply liberal.” Id. at 187. See also id. at 9 (“[T]o permit parties to make the 
choice . . . is not only likely to result in economically efficient outcomes, but in more liberal ones.”); 
Posner, supra note 138, at xv (“The party-centered approach corresponds to the emphasis in economics 
on the free market.”). For criticism, see Richardson, supra note 5, at 200–01. 
 161. Cf. Florian Rödl, Private Law Beyond Democracy? On the Legitimacy of Private Law “Beyond 
the State,”,56 AM. J. COMP. L. Part III (forthcoming 2008). 
 162. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 4. 
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C. Between and Beyond Private and International 
Despite their differences, both models thus share one important 
characteristic: they ultimately dispense of choice of law. The private-law model 
of choice of law has been shown to be merely a model of private law proper; the 
international-law model of choice of law is merely a model of international law 
proper. The private-law model disregards the international aspect, and the 
international-law model disregards the private aspect of private international 
law. If these two are the only available options, then private international law 
must be either private law or international law, for it cannot be both. What is 
more, the decision as to which it is depends in part on one’s general ideology 
(preference for the state or for the individual), in part on one’s general idea of 
law (private law is purely private law, or private law is public law), but not on 
any conviction specific to private international law. And how could it, if there is 
nothing specific to private international law? 
This would be an implausible outcome. At least since Joseph Story 
established Private International Law as a subfield of international law, distinct 
from both public international law and domestic private law alike,163 private 
international law has existed in tension between private law on the one hand 
and international law on the other. It seems implausible, to say the least, that all 
of this was just the fruit of muddled thinking. It seems implausible that all the 
subtle middle positions the field takes in, so many disputes—between forum 
preference and universalism, between party autonomy and mandatory rules, 
between substantive justice and conflicts justice—are merely errors of the mind. 
If economic models must dispense with such middle positions in order to 
function, the mistake may lie less with the field under research and more with 
the economic models. 
This makes the combined models more attractive. Indeed, Guzman, for 
example, realizes the problems with the assumptions of both the private- and 
the international-law model. Unfortunately, his solution is simply to defer 
public-choice issues to the realm of empirical facts (with which he is not 
concerned).164 Guzman’s own approach to party autonomy accords, in principle, 
with the international-law model: party autonomy has its place only when no 
third-party externalities exist. Where he disagrees with Trachtman is merely in 
the largely empirical questions whether such externalities arise or not in certain 
areas like securities law. Consequently, the impact of choice of law on 
substantive law is here largely delegated to objective determinations of 
applicable law. Choice-of-law rules should be designed so as to not give 
incentives to states to pass laws with considerable externalities. 
 
 163. STORY, supra note 26, § 9, 13; cf. Ralf Michaels, Public and Private International Law: German 
Views on Global Issues, 4 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 121, 127–28 (2008). 
 164. Guzman, supra note 8, at 903–04. 
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Guzman’s model, which focuses on objective determination of applicable 
law, is supplemented more than contrasted with the literature on regulatory 
competition. This literature looks at party autonomy precisely as an instrument 
to force states to abolish inefficient laws that hold them back in the competition 
for choice of their laws. Of course, the exact impact that party autonomy has on 
inefficient laws is quite unclear. In many areas, there will likely be no impact at 
all, because choice-of-law cases are rare. Where there is an impact, it is not 
always clear whether it is positive or negative. Party autonomy may lead to 
more-efficient domestic laws, because it forces states to compete over which 
produces the most attractive rules. The exact opposite may be true as well: 
party autonomy leads to less effective rules if many of the parties disadvantaged 
by them will, rather than lobby for their abolition, simply opt out of them, and 
domestic lobbies are not strong enough to change them domestically. The 
combination of these two effects provides a plausible explanation why states 
confine the application of certain rules to domestic contracts, or why some 
countries, in particular socialist countries, have altogether different rules for 
international transactions than for domestic ones. 
More importantly, not only is it difficult to assess whether a specific 
mandatory rule is desirable or not, it is also not clear from the outset whether 
individuals or states can better assess this question. This is so even in a domestic 
context. It is true even more in an international context, where different states 
have different rules and therefore presumably different views on the desirability 
of those rules. The focus on only party autonomy does not grasp the full extent 
of this problem because it merely replicates the simple domestic public–private 
tension on the international sphere. But there is not only one public in the 
international sphere. The international tension is much complicated by the 
partial overlap and partial tension among different state laws and therefore 
different views of the public. The opposite of private ordering is not merely 
public ordering but decentralized, multiple public ordering. A fully combined 
model will establish a complex combination of the relation between party 
autonomy and mandatory rules and carefully calibrated criteria to determine 
which state provides these mandatory rules in the first place. 
The huge (though largely untapped) potential of both the combined models 
and the regulatory competition literature lies in the fact that they explicitly 
address the question that the other approaches simply bracket: the combination 
between the economics of domestic lawmaking (private and public) and the 
economics of choice of law (private and public). This is a combination that 
traditional doctrine has not yet addressed adequately and one in which 
economics can make a true contribution. So far, much of that contribution has 
been confined to regulatory competition through party autonomy and the 
question whether this is a good or a bad thing. A proper analysis, by contrast, 
would ask not whether it is good or bad in the abstract, but whether private or 
public determination of the applicable law is superior regarding the specific 
issue in mind, and what regulatory consequences different public 
MICHAELS__BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC 10/27/2008  7:54:45 AM 
Summer 2008] ECONOMICS OF LAW AS CHOICE OF LAW 103 
 
determinations would have. Choice of law, in this vision, will neither fully yield 
to a market for laws (as the private-law model would have it), nor will it fully 
replace a market of laws (as the international-law model would have it). 
Instead, it will become the venue in which global governance takes place in an 
ever-altering complex mediation between private and public interests. 
V 
CONCLUSION: CHOICE OF LAW DISCOVERS ECONOMICS 
If the analysis presented in this article is correct, then the economic analysis 
of choice of law has not fulfilled the hopes. The pragmatism it provides has 
proven to be laden with ideology. Its empirical foundations are mixed with 
strong and often counterintuitive assumptions. Economics has provided choice 
of law with theoretical foundation, but instead of one it has offered three such 
theories—two of which turned out to be mere emanations from other fields. 
Economics is able to give clear guidelines for problems once a model is chosen, 
but it cannot give clear guidelines as to which model should be chosen, and the 
clear guidelines it can give for specific cases rest on a high degree of abstraction. 
And nonetheless (or better: precisely for these reasons), economics makes 
hugely important contributions to the field of choice of law. 
A first finding is that the economic analyses that have been proposed so far 
are riddled with the same problems as many normative economic analyses. 
Abstraction leads to false necessities and circular reasoning, sweeping 
normative suggestions are built on shaky models, ad hoc appeals to plausibility 
replace rigorous analysis, more or less plausible assumptions substitute for 
empirical data, problems are defined away, and abstract general statements are 
inapplicable in the real world. This critique is not unimportant, but it is 
relatively uninteresting. It does not capture what is peculiar to the economic 
analysis of choice of law; similar problems riddle economic analysis more 
generally, and more careful economists have long accepted and responded to 
such critiques. If some of the existing economic models are too abstract, or the 
conclusions too sweeping, perhaps all that is needed are better analyses within 
these models in order to provide solutions to our doctrinal problems. Moreover, 
as long as different models compete and lead to different outcomes, any false 
claim to objectivity is easily refuted. 
A second finding concerns the existence of these different models and the 
results they lead to. Quite remarkably, once the economic models are translated 
into doctrines, they look similar to existing doctrines—they reach the same 
results, and they face the same problems. Economic models repeat approaches 
that are known from doctrine and therefore replicate the outcomes of these old 
models. The discourse within the models uses the language of economics 
(though rarely in a purely formalized way), but this language looks to a large 
extent like a mere translation of familiar doctrinal structures. 
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This is an important finding because it strips the economic models of both 
their otherness and their alleged novelty, and because it suggests that, if 
economic analysts replicate the problems of choice of law, these problems are 
stickier than previously thought. However, this critique is likewise somewhat 
facile. Stripping economic models of their economics must necessarily leave 
them wanting. It is its otherness, not its familiarity, that makes the economic 
language interesting and potentially enriching to doctrinal models. The charm 
of the private-law model and the international-law model lies in the way in 
which they radically disentangle the private and the international aspect of 
choice of law and then drive them to extremes within their models. Although 
neither model is successful as a complete theory of choice of law, viewed 
together they show how radical the tension is that riddles our discipline, how 
radical its outcomes would be if only one of the two aspects ruled, and how 
improbable and at the same time fascinating it is that the discipline can keep the 
two aspects together. 
This leaves a third finding that concerns especially the combined model, and 
this finding does provide something new. The combined models do focus our 
attention on something that traditional choice-of-law doctrine has largely 
ignored: the potential impact of choice-of-law rules on the substance of 
domestic laws. Notably, these models rarely produce specific rules of choice of 
law. Guzman’s model operates at such a high degree of abstraction as to make 
specific application almost impossible. Also, the distinction between a private-
law model and an international-law model is repeated within these combined 
models, in which one focuses on the optimal allocation of jurisdiction and the 
other focuses on the salutary impact of party autonomy. But such irremediable 
differences, although they may be perceived as embarrassing to those seeking 
clear answers, are immensely helpful. They suggest that choice of law is an 
additional element of global governance beyond those of private ordering and 
international relations, and, in combining those two, perhaps even the most 
important one. 
If the economic models fail, both in combination and individually, to 
provide convincing responses to pressing problems of choice of law, this is not 
for lack of trying. The ultimate inability of economics to provide a convincing 
theory of choice of law suggests that, strange as this may sound, such a theory 
may be best sought within the practice and doctrine of choice of law. The 
impossibility of translating all problems of choice of law into economics 
(despite, or perhaps because of, the immense relevance of economics for choice 
of law) suggests the need for an understanding of choice of law that both 
highlights and downplays economic constraints and political determination. In 
the end, it appears that in all the apparent messiness, there is an intrinsic and 
apparently relatively stable inherent rationality to private international law. 
Economic models partly fail to grasp this rationality, and then what they grasp 
often fails to be of relevance. Or economic models replicate this rationality, but 
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then look inferior to the doctrinal models on which they build. Ultimately, it is 
up to choice of law as law to solve the problems of conflicting laws. 
Choice of law is not economics of law, just as law is not economics. Choice 
of law is dependent on economics, and it can benefit from economic reasoning. 
But, ultimately, the economic model cannot replace the need to find proper 
solutions in the real world. Perhaps economists have felt for a long time that the 
problems of choice of law are simply too complex, too messy, and based on too 
many variables to enable holistic attempts at achieving the economic optimum. 
The doctrine is fortunate that analysts have overcome these concerns and have 
presented their models. But what it takes away from these models is that, in the 
end, it will be up to the law, not to another field, to deal with them. 
